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"IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE":
BALANCING CLIENT LOYALTY AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
Nancy J. Moore*
INTRODUCTION

Shortly after the American Bar Association ("ABA") met to
consider the Ethics 2000 Commission's proposals (the "Ethics 2000
Proposals") to revise the ABA Model Rules,' I participated in a radio
program with Deborah Rhode and Sean SeLegue. 2 The subject of the
* Professor, Boston University School of Law. I am grateful to Professor Russell
Pearce for organizing, and to the Louis Stein Center for supporting, this Legal
Profession Colloquium on the topic of "What Does It Mean To Practice Law 'In The
Interests Of Justice' In The Twenty-first Century?" Most of all, I am grateful to
Deborah L. Rhode, Bacon-Kilkenny Distinguished Visiting Professor at Fordham
University School of Law, for a lifetime of work on the legal profession and for
writing the book that inspired this Colloquium. See infra note 6.
1. In 1997, the ABA created the Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, otherwise known as the Ethics 2000 Commission. Comm'n on
Evaluation of Rules of Prof'l Conduct, ABA, Report with Recommendation to the
House of Delegates (Aug. 2001) [hereinafter Report to the House], available at
http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-reporthome.html. The Commission was charged with
conducting a comprehensive review of the Model Rules. Id. In May 2001, the
Commission issued its report, recommending numerous changes to the Model Rules.
Id
The ABA House of Delegates met in August 2001 and considered the changes
proposed by the Commission to the Preamble and Scope of the Model Rules as well
as to Rules 1.0 through 1.10. See ABA Ctr. for Prof'l Responsibility, ABA, Summary
of House of Delegates action at the August 2001 Annual Meeting (Ethics 2000
Committee) [hereinafter Summary of House], availableat http://www.abanet.orgtcprl
e2k-summary_2001.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2001). The House is expected to
consider the remainder of the Model Rules, except for Rules 5.5 and 8.5, at the ABA
mid-year meeting in February 2002. Rules 5.5 and 8.5 will be considered later at the
Annual Meeting in August 2002, along with the forthcoming report of the ABA
Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice.
2. Deborah Rhode, the Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law at Stanford Law
School, is visiting at Fordham Law School this Fall and wrote a book that inspired this
Colloquium. See infra note 6. radio show is called Forun, and this segment aired live
on KQED-FM on Wednesday, August 8, 2001, from ten to eleven a.m. PCT. Forum
(KQED-FM, Aug. 8, 2001). Sean was one of the more vocal opponents of the
amendments to the confidentiality rule proposed by the Ethics 2000 Commission. See
William Glaberson, Lawyers Consider Easing Restriction on Client Secrecy, N.Y.
Times, July 31,2001, at Al.
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program was the ABA House of Delegates's votes on the Ethics 2000
Proposals to revise Model Rule 1.6, which governs confidentiality of
client information.3
The House had voted to broaden the

circumstances in which lawyers may disclose otherwise confidential
information regarding clients to prevent death or substantial bodily

harm, while maintaining the rule's current prohibition on disclosure to
prevent or rectify substantial economic harm, even when the lawyers'
services were used by their clients in furtherance of a crime or fraud.4
Sean opposed each of the Ethics 2000 Proposals, arguing that they
undermined the duty of loyalty owed by lawyers to their clients.5
Deborah supported the Ethics 2000 Proposals, but argued that they
did not go far enough to further the public good, particularly in their
failure to require lawyers to disclose information when necessary to

prevent death or substantial bodily harm.6
As Chief Reporter to the Ethics 2000 Commission, I supported the
Ethics 2000 Proposals, arguing that they struck just the right balance
3. The relevant portions of the Ethics 2000 Commission's proposed amendments

to current Rule 1.6(b) are as follows:
(b) A lawyer may reveal... information ...

(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property-of
another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the
lawyer's services:
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests
or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted
from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the
client has used the lawyer's services:
Report to the House, supra note 1, R. 1.6; see also Glaberson, supra note 2, at A17.
4. See generally Summary of House, supra note 1. At the mid-year meeting in
February 2002, the House of Delegates will entertain motions to amend previously
considered Rules. A motion has already been filed to amend Rule 1.6(b)(1) by
reinstating the requirement that the conduct be criminal and that the harm be
imminent before allowing lawyers to disclose information. Motion by David J.
Pasternak, Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n, Proposed Amendment to Ethics 2000
Commission Report (Nov. 2001) (on file with author).
5. Forum, supra note 2. Many of the opponents of proposed Rule 1.6(b)(2)
(disclosure to prevent future economic crime or fraud) did not formally oppose, or
testify against, proposed Rule 1.6(b)(1) (disclosure to prevent reasonably certain
death or substantial bodily harm). Sean testified, or was prepared to testify, before
the House of Delegates in opposition to both proposals. See ABA, 2001 Annual
Meeting Ethics 2000 Commission Excerpts 39-40 (Aug. 6-7, 2001) (draft transcript on
file with author) [hereinafter 2001 Annual Meeting] (testifying in favor of the Fox
amendment to proposed Rule 1.6(b)(1)); id. at 69 (listing Sean as one of the speakers
prepared to testify in favor of the Fox amendment to proposed Rule 1.6(b)(2), when
the House voted to close debate).
6. Forum, supra note 2. These views are consistent with those expressed by
Deborah in her recently published book that prompted this Colloquium. See Deborah
L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice 106-15 (2001) (criticizing the current
confidentiality rules).
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between preserving loyalty to clients and advancing the public good.
What I would like to do in this essay is expand on this argument. In
addition, I would like to address Deborah's further argument that the
ABA's continuing refusal to permit any disclosure to prevent or
rectify substantial economic harm, despite the Ethics 2000
Commission's suggestion to narrowly tailor an exception where the
lawyers' services are used, is yet additional evidence that lawyers have
failed to regulate themselves in the public interest, and that the time
has therefore come for direct public regulation of lawyers.1
I. THE CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS

A. Dissectingthe Argument That ProposedRule 1.6(b) Does Too
Much to Tip the Scale in Favorof the Public Good
Loyalty to clients has never been an absolute obligation of lawyers.
As I noted in rebuttal to Sean,9 the Preamble to the Model Rules
states that a lawyer is not just a client representative, but also "an
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special
responsibility for the quality of justice. ' ' u Indeed, as officers of the
legal system and public citizens having special responsibility for the
quality of justice, lawyers have always had special obligations to make
sure that their services are not used by clients to commit unlawful
acts." As for any so-called "tradition" of confidentiality,2 prior to the
adoption of the Model Rules in 1983, ABA codes permitted lawyers
to disclose the intent of a client to commit any crime, including
economic crimes.13 Thus, it was not so much the Ethics 2000
7. Forum, supra note 2.
8. Id; see also Rhode, supra note 6. at 143-47, 158-65.
9. Forum, supra note 2.
10. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct pmbl. (2000).
11. See Model Rules R. 1.2(d) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or
assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent ... ."); see
also Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(7) (1981) ("In his

representation of a client, a lawyer shall not ....

[clounsel or assist his client in

conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent."). ABA Canons of Prof'l

Ethics Canon 15 (1969) ("[T]he great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within
and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much

less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or
chicane.").
12 See, e g., Benjamin H. Hill, III, Remarks Before the ABA House of Delegates
(Aug. 7, 2001), in 2001 Annual Meeting, supra note 5, at 51 [hereinafter Hill,

Remarks] (characterizing proposed Rule 1.6(b)(2) as "an attempt to take away from
our common law tradition the attorney/client privilege as it has been applied over

literally centuries"); cf William G. Paul, Remarks Before the ABA House of
Delegates (Aug. 7, 2001), in 2001 Annual Meeting, supra note 5, at 61 [hereinafter

Paul, Remarks] ("To remain a profession with core values and fundamental guiding
principles, some things should never change and are not subject to being modernized.
One of those things is to preserve the confidence of a client.").
13. See ABA Canons, Canon 37 ("The announced intention of a client to commit

1778

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

Commission that broke with tradition, as it was the 1983 ABA House
of Delegates, when it refused to permit lawyers to disclose
information necessary to prevent a client from committing crimes
threatening economic, rather than physical, harm. 4
Even the most adamant opponents of the amendments proposed by
the Ethics 2000 Committee will readily concede that loyalty to clients
is not, and never has been, an absolute obligation. At the very least,
lawyers are required to withdraw when continuing the representation
would cause them to assist their clients in a crime or fraud. 5 In
addition, lawyers are permitted to make disclosures, even over the
objection of their clients, when necessary "to prevent the client from
committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm." 6 The first limitation
serves an obvious purpose, since lawyers cannot be required to break
the law themselves by virtue of being bound to continue representing
their clients no matter what their intentions under an absolute duty of
loyalty."

But, what about the second limitation? How can opponents

a crime is not included within the confidences which he is bound to respect. He may
properly make such disclosures as may be necessary to prevent the act or protect
those against whom it is threatened."); see also Model Code DR 4-101(C)(3) ("A
lawyer may reveal ....
[tihe intention of his client to commit a crime and the
information necessary to prevent the crime."). Historically, the original source of the
lawyer's obligation of confidentiality has not been lawyer codes of ethics, but rather
has been the common law attorney-client evidentiary privilege. See Nancy J. Moore,
Limits to Attorney-Client Confidentiality: A "Philosophically Informed" and
Comparative Approach to Legal and Medical Ethics, 36 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 177,
198-99 (1985-86) [hereinafter Moore, Limits]. There, too, the announced intention of
a client to commit a future crime or fraud has never come within the protection of the
privilege. Id. at 201.
14. See generally Nancy J. Moore, Remarks Before the ABA House of Delegates
(Aug. 7, 2001), in 2001 Annual Meeting, supra note 5, at 53-54 [hereinafter Moore,
Remarks].
15. See Model Rules R. 1.16(a)(1) (providing that "except [when ordered to do so
by a tribunal] a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has
commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if... the
representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other
law"); see also Model Rules R. 1.2(d) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage,
or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent .. .
16. Model Rules R. 1.6(b)(1).
17. But cf Bruce Jay Friedman, Mr. Prinzo's Breakthrough, in Far from the City
of Class 88 (1966). This is a black comedy short story, in which Prinzo, a psychiatric
patient with a cringe, tests the doctor-patient "compact" by murdering the
psychiatrist's wife. When Prinzo confesses to the murder, the psychiatrist agrees that
he cannot call the police, but at the same time, he initially refuses to help Prinzo
dispose of the body. Prinzo reminds the psychiatrist of his earlier statement that the
purpose of the compact is to give assurance that doctors will do whatever is best for
their patients. The psychiatrist reluctantly agrees to help. At the end of the story, the
psychiatrist notices that Prinzo has been cured of his cringe, at which time he joyfully
declares that Prinzo is no longer his patient and immediately turns Prinzo in to the
police. The story is full of inaccuracies about a doctor's obligation of confidentiality,
but it does illustrate the absurdity of an ethical rule that puts welfare of patients (and,
analogously, clients) above all else.
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like Sean justify distinguishing between permitting disclosures to
prevent violent crimes and not permitting disclosures to prevent
economic crimes, both of which could result in substantial harm?
The standard defense posed by those who oppose loosening the
obligation of confidentiality is based on the comment to current Rule
1.6:
[T]o the extent a lawyer is required or permitted to disclose a
client's purposes, the client will be inhibited from revealing facts
which would enable the lawyer to counsel against a wrongful course
of action. The public is better protected if full and open
communication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited."
In other words, loyalty to the client in keeping information
confidential is not an end in itself, but rather a means of furthering the
public interest. When clients are encouraged to confide in lawyers
through the imposition of a nearly absolute obligation of
confidentiality, lawyers are in a better position, armed with candid
information regarding their clients' intent, to dissuade their clients
from pursuing an unlawful course of conduct, thereby benefiting the
public. Lawyers may not succeed in every instance, but in the long
run (so this argument goes), promoting confidentiality to the fullest
extent furthers the public interest in preventing crimes and frauds. 9
As I have previously argued, however, there are serious flaws in this
type of consequentialist reasoning. 0 First, there is simply no empirical
evidence from which to predict that even in the long run more crimes
and frauds will be prevented under a rule of strict confidentiality than
under a rule that permits disclosure in certain cases.2 ' Indeed, there is
reason to believe that a rule of strict confidentiality will actually have
little effect, if any, on preventing crimes and fraud, since, even under
18. Model Rules R. 1.6 cmt.
19. A number of those who spoke in opposition to the Ethics 2000 Commission's
proposed Rule 1.6(b)(2) emphasized the danger of lawyers being sued as a result of
failing to disclose their clients' intended crime or fraud, even though the disclosure
under the proposed rule would have been permissive, and not mandatory. See, eg.,
Lawerence J. Fox, Remarks Before the ABA House of Delegates (Aug. 7,2001), in
2001 Annual Meeting, supra note 5, at 56-57 (stating that lawyers will be the subject
of litigation if proposed Rule 1.6(b)(2) passes); Hill, Remarks, supra note 12, at 51
(arguing that Rule 1.6(b)(2) promotes lawyers to behave according to a standard of
care which, under changes to the Preamble, may actually provide evidence of a breach
of an applicable standard of conduct). Despite the fact that rules similar to proposed
Rule 1.6(b)(2) exist in most states, see infra note 60, there is no evidence that lawyers
in these states are sued more frequently than lawyers in other states; nor is there any
evidence that lawyers have been sued specifically for violating a rule that permits, but
does not require, disclosure of client wrongdoing. See, eg., Don Hilliker, Remarks
Before the ABA House of Delegates (Aug. 7, 2001), in 2001 Annual Meeting, supra
note 5, at 63-65 (describing personal experience in Illinois, which permits disclosure
even when lawyer's services have not been used by the client in furtherance of the
crime or fraud).
20. See Moore, Limits, supra note 13, at 223-24.
21. Id. at 224.
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such a rule, clients would have just as strong an incentive as they
would under a more lenient rule to lie to their lawyers-that is, to
prevent them from withdrawing to avoid assisting the planned crime
or fraud.22 Also, without at least the threat of disclosure, lawyers have
little means of "persuading" otherwise recalcitrant clients to comply
with the law.'
Second, the consequentialist argument fails to explain why the
current Model Rules permit lawyers to reveal crimes threatening
death or substantial bodily harm, but not crimes threatening economic
harm.24 Presumably, the assumption about long-range protection of
the public against crimes and frauds applies equally to both situations.
If we assume that less economic harm to the public will occur under a
rule of non-disclosure, shouldn't we also assume that more lives will
be saved in the long
run if lawyers are prohibited from disclosing
25
threats of murder?
In my opinion, there are two arguments for permitting lawyers to
disclose their clients' intent to commit a crime threatening death or
substantial bodily harm, and both arguments apply with equal force to
crimes threatening economic harm.
The first argument is
consequentialist: given that, in the short term, harm to the public is
virtually certain if lawyers do not disclose information regarding their
clients' intent to commit a crime, the burden of proof must be
shouldered by those who argue that more harm to the public will be
prevented in the long run under a rule of strict confidentiality. As
explained above, however, given the lack of empirical evidence to
support this claim, coupled with good reason to believe that rules of
strict confidentiality will not, in fact, prevent more harm even in the

22. This is precisely what happened in the famous case involving O.P.M., Inc.

(believe it or not, O.P.M. actually stood for "other people's money"), in which O.P.M.
officials did everything they could to hide ongoing criminal and fraudulent activities

in connection with multi-million dollar bank loans to convince Singer Huttner lawyers
to continue closing the loans. When Singer Huttner finally resigned in the face of
mounting evidence of crime and fraud, O.P.M. hired Kaye Scholer and lied to the
lawyers to acquire their services with respect to more loan transactions. See generally
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Ethics and the Law: A Case History, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1983,
(Magazine), at 31.
23. Moore, Limits, supra note 13, at 224.
24. Id.

25. Id. at 225. For example, in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), the majority held that "the public interest in safety from
violent assault" justified the imposition of a duty on the part of a therapist to warn a
known victim of an impending assault by a patient, id. at 346, 348, while the dissent
argued, in part, that more lives would be saved if therapists guarantee their patients

confidential treatment of all information, including threats of violence, id. at 358
(Clark, J., dissenting) ("Overwhelming policy considerations weigh against imposing a
duty on psychotherapists to warn a potential victim against harm. While offering
virtually no benefit to society, such a duty will frustrate psychiatric treatment, invade
fundamental patient rights and increase violence.").
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long run,26 lawyers should be entitled to act to prevent the short-term
harm, whether physical or economic in nature. This argument
supports limited disclosure of information by lawyers with respect to
their clients' intent to commit not only crimes threatening death or
substantial bodily harm, but also crimes threatening economic injury.
The second argument is non-consequentialist. According to this
argument, clients who threaten crimes of violence (or, presumably,
crimes threatening substantial economic harm) are "unjust
aggressors" who have forfeited any right to the protection of their
privacy, at least with respect to such threats. 7 Indeed, this is precisely
the type of reasoning that traditionally was used to justify the
disclosure provisions of the pre-1983 codes of ethics,2 as well as the
crime-fraud exception to the evidentiary privilege, -9 neither of which
is limited to crimes of violence. This argument also supports limited
disclosure of information by lawyers with respect to their clients'
intent to commit either type of crime.
B. Dissectingthe Argument That ProposedRule 1.6(b) Does Not Do
Enough to Tip the Scale in Favorof the Public Good
Let me turn, then, to the argument made by Deborah Rhode. If
lawyers are permitted to disclose otherwise confidential information to
further the public good, then why should the reasoning not be
extended a step further to require lawyers to disclose information to
prevent future harm, particularly when the harm threatened is death
or substantial bodily harm? 30 On a related note, why should
disclosure with respect to future economic crimes or frauds be limited
26. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
27. Moore, Limits, supra note 13, at 194-95, 225. See also Report to the House,
supra note 1, Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) Reporter's Explanation of Changes, in which it
was stated:

Use of the lawyer's services for such improper ends [as the commission of a
crime or fraud threatening substantial economic harm] constitutes a serious
abuse of the client-lawyer relationship. The client's entitlement to the

protection of the Rule must be balanced against the prevention of the injury
that would otherwise be suffered and the interest of the lawyer in being able
to prevent the misuse of the lawyer's services.
28. See, e.g., ABA Canons of Prof'l Ethics Canon 37 (1969) (-The announced
intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which he
is bound to respect.").
29. See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 15 (1933). Here, the Court states:
There is a privilege protecting communications between attorney and client.
The privilege takes flight if the relation is abused. A client who consults an
attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have
no help from the law. He must let the truth be told.
ld- at 15.
30. See also Stephen Gillers, A Duty to Warn, N.Y. Times, July 26, 2001, at A25
("But the commission's proposal does not go far enough. If physical harm is indeed
'reasonably certain' to occur, lawyers should not be merely permitted to break
confidences; they should have no choice in the matter.").
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to situations where the lawyer's services have been or are being used
by the client in furtherance of such crimes or frauds? 31 The answer to
both questions, I believe, is that ethics codes typically do not (and
should not) require lawyers to further the public good in any direct,
consequentialist sense. Rather, they assume that the public interest
will be furthered when lawyers are loyal to their clients within limits
defined by the lawyers' simultaneous roles as officers of the legal
system and public citizens having special responsibility for the quality
of justice. 32 Thus, the disclosure provisions in Rule 1.6 should be
viewed not as evidence of an affirmative duty of lawyers to further the
public good, but rather as limitations on lawyers' obligations of loyalty
to their clients, thereby freeing them to act as independent moral
agents.33
So, what are, or should be, the limits on lawyers' obligations of
loyalty to their clients? One clear limit is based on the concept of the
client as an "unjust aggressor"-that is, one who has forfeited any
right to the lawyer's loyalty. 3 The Ethics 2000 Proposals, however,
seek to establish limits that are both broader and narrower than the
"unjust aggressor" argument would suggest. They are broader in that
lawyers may now disclose information to prevent any reasonably
certain death or substantial bodily harm, regardless of whether their
clients are perpetrating a crime or other unlawful act. 5 They are
narrower in that disclosure of information to prevent economic crimes
or frauds is limited to situations where the lawyers' services have been
31. Deborah did not raise this question during the radio program, nor do I recall
that she has raised it elsewhere. But, others have. See, e.g., Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers § 117A(1)(b) & n.1 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, Mar. 1996)
(explaining that Chief Reporter Charles Wolfram and others favored deletion of the
requirement that a lawyer's services were, or are being, employed by the client in
furtherance of the crime or fraud as a prerequisite to permissive disclosure to prevent
substantial financial loss).
32. The lawyer's duty of loyalty is a basic principle of agency theory under which
many of the lawyer's duties to his or her client may be derived. We may differ about
the precise scope of the limitations that should be imposed on that duty, but we
should all agree that it would be meaningless to say that an agent owes a duty of
loyalty to his or her principal, if the agent were simultaneously obliged to directly
pursue "the public interest." Cf. David Luban, Introduction to The Good Lawyer:
Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers' Ethics 8-11 (David Luban ed., 1983) [hereinafter The
Good Lawyer] (discussing the agency theory of ethics and limitations on the "rule of
undivided loyalty,"' as applied to both lawyer and non-lawyer agents).
33. Even under the current Model Rules, lawyers have an affirmative duty to
disclose client perjury when the client refuses to do so. See Model Rules of Prof'l
Conduct R. 3.3(a)(4) (2000). This duty arises from the lawyer's unique role as an
officer of the court. See Report to the House, supra note 1, R. 3.3 cmt. 2 ("This Rule
sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that
undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process.") (underlining omitted); see also
Model Rules R. 3.3(a)(3) (providing for the duty to disclose legal authority that is
directly adverse to the position of the client).
34. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
35. See supra note 3 (proposed changes to Rule 1.6(b)(1)).
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or are being used by the clients in furtherance of such crimes or

frauds.36

Limiting disclosure of economic crimes or frauds to situations
where the lawyers' services are involved is relatively easy to explain.
Disclosure to prevent economic harm has been more controversial
within the profession than disclosure to prevent physical harm.
Indeed, for some lawyers, such disclosure is problematic precisely
because of the frequency of conflicts that arise between the clients'
economic interests and the economic interests of others, thus raising
the specter of a rather thin obligation of client loyalty.3 On the other
hand, a client who has tricked the lawyer into participating in unlawful
conduct (conduct in which the lawyer would never have engaged had
the lawyer known the true circumstances) is an "unjust aggressor" of
the worst sort-one who has abused a relationship of trust for his or
her own selfish ends. Therefore, once the lawyer discovers the true
circumstances, the lawyer has a strong claim in favor of freedom to
disclose information, either to protect a victim to whom the lawyer
may feel a special moral obligation (to the extent that such lawyer's
services have or will contribute to the harm), or to protect the lawyer
himself or herself, who might well be accused of having knowingly
participated in the client's unlawful conduct.But, how then could the Ethics 2000 Commission justify its
expansion of the confidentiality provision to allow disclosure of
information to prevent any reasonably certain death or substantial
bodily harm? First, in the vast majority of cases, the threat of such
harm probably will come from a client's stated intent to commit a
crime of violence, in which case the client would indeed be an "unjust
aggressor" who is undeserving of the lawyer's loyalty. Second, if the
client's future conduct is merely tortious (but not criminal or
fraudulent), and the client refuses to desist or disclose information,
the client may also be characterized as an "unjust aggressor." Third,
36. See supra note 3 (proposed new provisions in Rules 1.6(b)(2) and (3)); see also
supra note 31 (noting that the Chief Reporter to the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers favored deletion of this requirement in the Restatement).
37. See Moore, Limits, supra note 13, at 208-11 (differentiating between
physicians and lawyers on the basis that there are more frequent conflicts between the
interests of clients and others than there are between the interests of patients and

others).
38. For example, in the infamous O.P.M. scandal, the Singer Huttner law firm
ultimately paid approximately $10 million to settle a series of lawsuits resulting from
their alleged participation in their client's frauds. Some of their participation was

clearly unwitting, even though it is arguable that for some time they purposefully
"buried their heads in the sand" to avoid "knowing" that their client was engaged in

an ongoing fraud. See Taylor, supra note 22, at 33 (detailing the history of the Singer

Huttner law firm's involvement with O.P.M.); see also Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr., Testimony Before the House of Delegates (Aug. 7, 2001), in 2001 Annual
Meeting, supra note 5, at 60-61 (arguing that proposed Rule 1.6(b)(2) is necessary as a
"measure of self-protection" for lawyers).
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even when the client is a mere bystander, non-consequentialist
reasoning may still permit the client's right to loyalty to be
overridden, but for a reason other than that such client is considered
an "unjust aggressor." Rather, the client's right to loyalty may be
deemed to be outweighed by another equal, or more basic, right or
duty associated with non-clients. 39 True, there are no generally
recognized criteria for establishing priorities among various rights and
duties; 40 moreover, it is not clear that non-clients have a "right" to be
protected by lawyers from harm, particularly when the harm comes
from someone other than the client." Nevertheless, lawyers, as moral
agents, have both the right and the (moral) duty to act to prevent
harm to others, at least in those circumstances where the cost to the
lawyer is not high.42 Ordinarily, this right and duty are overridden by
the lawyer's duty of loyalty owed to the client. 43 But, when the
potential harm to the client of disclosure is slight in comparison to the
potential harm to others that can be prevented by disclosure, then
arguably the limits of the lawyer's obligation of confidentiality have
been reached. 4 And, when the harm threatened to others is a
function of conduct other than an intended client crime, then it is
likely that the harm (to the client) of disclosure will be far less than
the harm to be prevented by disclosure (i.e., death or substantial
bodily harm) of otherwise confidential information.4 5
Ironically, it is possible that broadening the permissive power of
lawyers to disclose client information actually runs counter to
Deborah's argument in support of making disclosure mandatory.
After all, there may well be circumstances when the harm suffered by
the client of disclosure would be substantial, even in comparison to
the harm threatening the innocent non-client. Take, for example, a
client who confesses to the lawyer that he or she has committed a
crime for which another person has been arrested, perhaps even
convicted and sentenced to die. The client has not in any sense
abused his or her relationship with the lawyer to warrant
characterization as an "unjust aggressor," as, indeed, confession of
39. See Moore, Limits, supra note 13, at 194-95 (discussing the limits on a
physician's obligation of confidentiality when the patient's right to privacy is
overridden by some other equal or more basic right or duty).
40. Id.
41. For example, lawyers have no general legal duty to prevent harm to nonclients. See, e.g., Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 51 (2000). Even with
respect to moral duties, while there may be a duty to prevent harm to others, this duty
of beneficence is often characterized as an "imperfect obligation," i.e., one that does
not entail a correlative "right" on the part of any particular individual to be a
recipient of this duty. See Tom L. Beauchamp, Philosophical Ethics 201-03, 211-12
(1982) (discussing the correlativity thesis and the duty of beneficence).
42. Cf Beauchamp, supra note 41, at 211-12.
43. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
44. Cf Moore, Limits, supra note 13, at 195.
45. See id. at 231-33.
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past crimes is the very paradigm of the proper purpose of seeking

legal advice.! Moreover, because the crime is in the past, there is no
way the client can avoid the harm of disclosure by simply renouncing
the intent to commit the crime.47 Finally, the potential harm to the
client resulting from the lawyer's disclosure-arrest, conviction, and

imposition of the death sentence-may be equal in magnitude to the
harm currently threatening the non-client in the event of nondisclosure, with the only difference being the innocence of the nonclient and the guilt of the client. Although, in this situation, that

difference between innocence and guilt may suffice to tip the scale in
favor of disclosure by the lawyer,1 if there is any chance that the
innocent non-client might be saved by other means, or if there are any
other factors mitigating against disclosure, it would be difficult to
conclude that the lawyer must sacrifice the client to the authorities for
the sake of "the public good."4 9

In sum, lawyers may be officers of the legal system and public
citizens having special responsibility for the quality of justice, but they
are not thereby law enforcement officers akin to police or
prosecutors.- They should be free to act as independent moral agents
46. See id. at 234; cf Text of InitialDraft of Ethics Code Rewrite Committee, Legal
Times of Washington, Aug. 27, 1979, at 28 (stating an alternative provision of the
initial draft of the Model Rules requiring a lawyer to disclose information about a
client to the extent necessary "[tlo prevent or rectify the consequences of a
deliberately wrongful act by the client in which the lawyer's services are or were
involved, except when the lawyer has been employed after the commission of such an
act to representthe client concerning the act orits consequences" (emphasis added)).
47. See Moore, Limits,supra note 13, at 234 (noting that the traditional distinction
between past and future conduct is sometimes justified on the ground that the chilling
effect of disclosure with regard to past misconduct is stronger than that with regard to
future misconduct, because, in the former instance, clients lack the option of
preventing disclosure by renouncing their intent to commit the intended misconduct).
48. See, e.g., Mass. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6(b)(1) (2001) (stating that the
lawyer may reveal information "to prevent the wrongful execution or incarceration of
another").
49. See Moore, Limits, supra note 13, at 232-33 (arguing for permissive disclosure
to prevent death or substantial bodily harm on the ground that when the client's
interest in privacy in a particular case is substantial, "the lawyer may be persuaded to
maintain confidentiality, if that privacy interest is not clearly outweighed by the more
important interests of others," and concluding that "the final resolution of this
dilemma appears to depend on the desirability of allowing individual lawyers to
determine when disclosure is morally appropriate").
50. Some opponents of the Ethics 2000 Commission's proposals to permit limited
disclosure of future economic crimes or frauds argued that the effect of these
proposals would be to turn lawyers into policemen. See, e.g., Paul, Remarks, supra
note 12, at 63 ("Let us not seek to be policemen. Let us not seek to be judges of our
clients...."). See also, e.g., Robert J. Grey, Jr., Remarks Before the House of
Delegates (Aug. 7,2001), in 2001 Annual Meeting, supra note 5, at 66, in which it was
stated:
[T]o suggest that we should adopt a rule that turns lawyers into investigators,
into prosecutors, into judges and juries, to determine whether their clients
have, in fact, committed a crime or a fraud is inconsistent with the idea that
we establish the relationship built on loyalty, based on trust, and based on
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when the limits of client loyalty have been reached, but at the same
time, they should not be obligated to perform as agents of the state in
situations where private citizens have no similar obligation."
II. CONTINUING SELF-REGULATION BY LAWYERS

While I was delighted that the House of Delegates tentatively

approved the expansion of the confidentiality provision to more
readily permit disclosure of otherwise confidential information to
prevent death or substantial bodily harm, it was extremely
disappointing to see the House soundly reject amendments that would
have enabled lawyers to disclose information to prevent or rectify
substantial economic harm, even in the narrow instance where the
harm resulted from crimes or frauds committed through the use of a
lawyer's services."2 Nevertheless, I do not agree with Deborah that
the ABA's continuing refusal to recognize a lawyer's right to disclose
information to prevent economic harm is yet further evidence that
self-regulation by lawyers has failed, and that it is,53 therefore, time to
permit non-lawyers to regulate the practice of law.

It is certainly true, as Deborah states in her book,' that the "public
has had almost no voice in [the] formulation or enforcement"55 of
lawyer ethics codes. I am not convinced, however, that all, or even

most, of the shortcomings of the present system of self-regulation5 6

would be overcome by direct public regulation of lawyers, either
through legislatures or through administrative agencies. 7 Deborah
herself recognizes that the public lacks sufficient information to press

the willingness of our clients to tell us the truth.
I strongly disagree that permissive disclosure provisions in any way turn lawyers into
agents of the state, but I do agree that mandatory disclosure rules would do so. Such
rules mandating disclosure are justified in some circumstances (e.g., disclosing client
perjury to a court), but they should be rare. See supra note 33.
51. Private citizens do not have a legal duty to prevent death or substantial bodily
harm, even when it is the result of an intended criminal act. See, e.g., People v. Oliver,
258 Cal. Rptr. 138, 142-43 (1989) (no duty under criminal law); Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 314 (1965) (no duty under tort law).
52. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
54. Rhode, supra note 6, at 145.
55. Id.
56. Deborah is unquestionably correct that there are shortcomings in the present
system of self-regulation by lawyers, and that many of these shortcomings can be
traced to the profession's interest in self-protection. One example I would cite from
personal experience is the ABA's refusal to endorse written fee agreements. See infra
note 67.
57. Direct public regulation of lawyers by either legislatures or administrative
agencies is currently prohibited in most states by the inherent powers doctrine, under
which the judicial branch of state governments is held to have the exclusive authority
to regulate the legal profession. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 2.2.3
(1986). Of course, this doctrine can be changed by state constitutional amendment.
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for fundamental change.5 Moreover, as she further concedes, both
legislators and agency officials "are subject to capture by those

[whom] they seek to regulate."59
I would like to make three additional arguments in favor of the
present system of self-regulation by lawyers. First, despite the
continuing refusal of the ABA to adopt a confidentiality provision
permitting lawyers to disclose information regarding future economic
crimes or frauds, such a provision has been adopted by the vast
majority of the states.' Indeed, some states have even required
lawyers to make such disclosures, or at least disclosures regarding
crimes threatening death or substantial bodily harm.6 Second, there

is reason to fear that direct public regulation of lawyers may have
negative effects in certain areas of legal ethics where there is a special
risk that the public will misunderstand the unique function of lawyers.
Third, if there is direct public regulation of lawyers, lawyers may cease
viewing themselves as professionals with special responsibilities to
further the public interest.6 Each of these arguments are analyzed in
turn.

First, what is the significance of the fact that the vast majority of
lawyers are permitted, and sometimes required, to disclose client
confidences to prevent economic crimes or frauds, despite the ABA's
constant refusal to allow such disclosure? I submit that this is prima
facie evidence that the present system is working pretty well, at least
with respect to the promulgation of ethics codes." There are a
58. Rhode, supra note 6, at 146.
59. Id.
60. See Moore, Remarks, supra note 14, at 58:
The vast majority of states soundly rejected [the current ABA rule on
confidentiality]. Only nine states have adopted Model Rule 1.6. One state,
California, has an even more restrictive rule. The other 41 jurisdictions
continue to adhere to a confidentiality rule that permits lawyers to disclose
to prevent economic harm in at least some circumstances.... Forty-one
jurisdictions either permit or require disclosure to prevent a client from
perpetrating a fraud that constitutes a crime. Of these 41 jurisdictions, 11
also permit or require disclosure to prevent non-criminal frauds likely to
result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another.
Of these 41 jurisdictions, 28 permit or require [disclosure] without regard to
the magnitude of loss to the affected persons.
61. Nine jurisdictions require lawyers to disclose client information related to
crimes threatening death or substantial bodily harm. See Ariz. Rules of Prof'l
Conduct R 1.6 (2002); Fla. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 4-1.6 (2001); I11.
Rules of Profl
Conduct R. 1.6 (2001); Nev. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 156 (2002); NJ. Rules of
Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6 (2002); N.D. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6 (2001); Tex. Rules
of Prof'i Conduct R. 1.05 (2001); Va. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6 (2001); Wise.
Rules of Prof l Conduct for Attorneys R. 20:1.6 (2002).
62. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
63. As Deborah suggests, there is also a problem with the inadequate
enforcement of standards of conduct. Rhode, supra note 6, at 146. There is reason to
believe that legislative funding for the disciplinary enforcement of lawyers would be
even less generous under a system of direct regulation of lawyers than under the
present system. See ABA Ctr. for Prof'l Responsibility, ABA, Lawyer Regulation for
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number of reasons why the present system is working as well as it is.
One factor is that there is no single organization of lawyers that
decides what provisions to insert in a lawyer ethics code; the ABA
may be influential, but it cannot determine the content of the state
codes that actually bind the nation's lawyers.' Another factor is that

lawyers are not entirely self-regulating.
As Deborah herself
acknowledges, ethics codes are promulgated and enforced by state
court judges, not state bar associations.65 I concede that judges, as
former lawyers, and increasingly, as future lawyers, are often
sympathetic to bar interests.66 The most recent evidence, however,

suggests that many state courts have done quite well in carrying out
their responsibility to promulgate state ethics codes with provisions

that reflect not merely the bar's desires and wishes, but also the public
a New Century, Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary
Enforcement, at n.4 [hereinafter Lawyer Regulation for a New Century] (discussing
testimony that the New York lawyer disciplinary agencies, whose funds are controlled
by the State Legislature, were severely under-funded, and explaining that,
subsequently, the Legislature increased lawyer registration fees, but did not increase
the agencies' direct funding). A recent evaluation of disciplinary enforcement
concluded that there is "no persuasive evidence that legislative regulation of other
professions has resulted in better protection of the public," because "legislatively
created regulatory bodies suffer from the same problems as do judicially created
lawyer disciplinary agencies." Id. (Recommendation 1).
64. See generally Wolfram, supra note 57, § 2.2.2 (discussing the inherent powers
doctrine, under which state supreme courts typically promulgate ethics codes that are
binding on lawyers admitted in a given jurisdiction). Indeed, it was the proliferation
of variations of the Model Rules, as adopted by the different states, that was at least
partially responsible for the decision of the ABA to create the Ethics 2000
Commission to undertake a comprehensive evaluation of the Model Rules. See Nancy
J. Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting in the 21st Century, 30 Hofstra L. Rev.
(forthcoming Spring 2002) [hereinafter Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting].
65. See Rhode, supra note 6, at 146. With respect to lawyer discipline, it is true
that there are still some jurisdictions in which disciplinary functions are conducted by
bar association officials rather than staff controlled and managed by the state's
highest court. Lawyer Regulation for a New Century, supra note 63 (text preceding
Recommendation 5). A recent report by the ABA Commission on Evaluation of
Disciplinary Enforcement continued to urge that "[a]ll jurisdictions should structure
their lawyer disciplinary systems so that disciplinary officials are appointed by the
highest court of the jurisdiction or by other disciplinary officials who are appointed by
the Court." Id. (Recommendation 5).
66. See Lawyer Regulation for a New Century, supra note 63 (Recommendation

5).
[L]awyers often claim that ultimate governance authority rests with state
judges, who do not face the same conflicts of interests as practitioners. Yet
the history of self-regulation suggests the limitations of such oversight. Most
judges are by training and temperament sympathetic to bar interests.
Moreover, their reputation, effectiveness, and reelection may depend
heavily on support from lawyers. Seldom has the judiciary attempted to
impose regulation that might seriously compromise lawyers' status, income,
or power.
Rhode, supra note 6, at 146. While I agree that judges are often sympathetic to bar
interests, I believe that their status as judges has a very real impact on their
willingness to support regulation that is more onerous than that favored by the bar.
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interest.67 Moreover, I believe it is also the case that state bar
associations deserve much of the credit for initiating or supporting
potentially far-reaching proposals, such as those requiring lawyers to
put fee agreements or conflicts waivers in writing.'
State code
variations may present problems for cross-border practice, but they
also have the significant benefit of permitting and encouraging a level
of experimentation that would never go forward at the national
level.69
Second, the lack of public understanding of legal institutions and
the legal profession creates a significant risk that direct public
regulation of lawyers may lead to substantial adverse effects in some
areas of particular sensitivity. The most obvious concern is with
respect to the representation of criminal defendants, particularly those
who have admitted to their lawyers that they did, in fact, commit the
crime for which they are charged. The public consistently fails to
understand the importance of the lawyer's role in forcing the state to
meet the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt through
methods that are consistent with the law.7u Thus, direct public
regulation of lawyer conduct may not provide sufficient
accommodation to the unique role of the criminal defense lawyer.
Another example of the public misunderstanding of certain areas of
legal ethics concerns the allocation of decision-making between
lawyer and client. The only proposal that the Ethics 2000 Commission
received from a consumer organization contained a mistaken
statement that Model Rule 1.2(a) currently requires lawyers to abide
by their clients' instructions with respect to the means to be used to
accomplish the clients' objectives.71 In addition to arguing that this
67. As previously noted, most states have determined that lawyers ought to be
permitted (and sometimes even required) to disclose client information to protect
third parties. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. Similarly, although the ABA
has refused to endorse written fee agreements, seven states have done so. See Moore,
Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting, supra note 64. Moreover, three states require that
conflicts waivers either be in writing or be confirmed in writing, which led the ABA
Ethics Commission to propose (and the ABA House of Delegates to adopt) a
provision in the Model Rules requiring that such waivers be confirmed in writing. Id.
68. See supra note 67.
69. See Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting,supra note 64.
70. Cf.David Luban, The Adversary System F-rcuse, in The Good Lawyer, supra
note 32, at 83, 91-93 (arguing that the public preoccupation with crime and criminals
leads to a perception that the "paradigm of the morally dubious representation is the
defense of the guilty criminal," whereas lawyers generally know that -[the good
criminal defense lawyer puts the state to its proof in the most stringent and
uncompromising way possible").
71. See James C. Turner & Theresa Meehan Rudy, Statement Before the ABA
Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Aug. 11. 2000)
("[W]hile [current Model] Rule 1.2 implicitly acknowledges that a lawyer has an
ethical obligation to respect a client's decisions and requires obedience in a criminal
case, it fails to make it clear that the client's decisions in a civil case too must be
obeyed."), available at http://vww.halt.orglLAP/Ethics2000.htm; see also infra note
72. This statement is clearly mistaken. While Rule 12(a) requires a lawyer to "abide
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requirement be retained,' the organization further suggested that the
comment to that rule
should include clear instruction that even if honest disagreement
between the lawyer and client about the best way to proceed exists,
so long as a lawyer is retained by a client, the client's instructions
should be followed, unless doing so would constitute
73 a criminal act
or violate the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

While there is some merit to this proposal, 74 the issues involved are,
nevertheless, complex and arguably beyond the comprehension of
those who lack adequate knowledge of the legal profession. Courts
have not endorsed the proposition that clients retain complete control
over the means of their representation, for example, when their
instruction concerns matters of strategy or tactics.75 Moreover, if
lawyers are to continue viewing themselves as professionals, and not
merely hired guns, then surely they must be afforded a fair measure of
autonomy in performing their work. Therefore, in my view,
accommodating the legitimate interests of both clients and lawyers in
allocating decision-making authority is a task better suited for lawyers
(and courts) than for non-lawyers who might be empowered to
regulate the conduct of lawyers.7 6

by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation," it requires only
that a lawyer "shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be
pursued." Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct Rule 1.2(a) (2000) (emphasis added). See
also 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 5.5, at
5-12 (3d ed. 2001), in which it was stated:
The first sentence of Model Rule 1.2(a) draws a distinction between the
"objectives" (or ends) of legal representation and the "means" used to
achieve them. The same sentence also allocates responsibility for
decisionmaking in these two arenas. The rule provides that generally
"objectives" are for the client, while "means" are for the lawyer.
7Z See Turner & Rudy, supra note 71 ("If Model Rule 1.2(a) is to carry weight,
however, it must retain the language that requires lawyers to abide by a client's
instructions with respect to the means to be used to accomplish the client's
objectives.").
73. Id.
74. See Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 21(2) (2000) (taking the
same position).
75. See 1 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 8,9, at 825

(2000).

76. See Report to the House, supra note 1, Model Rule 1.2(a) Reporter's
Explanation of Changes, which states:
Other than acknowledging the power of the client to revoke a lawyer's
implied authority, the Commission has not attempted to specify the lawyer's
duties when the lawyer and client disagree about the means to be used to
accomplish the client's objectives. As explained in Comment [2], the
Commission believes that disagreements between a lawyer and client about
means must be worked out by the lawyer and client within a framework
defined by the law of agency, the right of the client to discharge the lawyer
and the right of the lawyer to withdraw from the representation if the lawyer
has a fundamental disagreement with the client.
See also Pl, Model Rule 1.16(b)(4) Reporter's Explanation of Changes (stating that a
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Third, although the concept of lawyer professionalism has been
both misunderstood and overused,' I believe that ultimately it is in
the public interest for lawyers to continue viewing themselves as

professionals, with obligations not only as client representatives, but
also as officers of the court and public citizens having special
responsibility for the quality of justice. 8 Unless and until it can be
convincingly demonstrated that there is an alternative framework for
regulating lawyers that would prove more beneficial to the public as a
whole,79 and continue to be effective in protecting individual rights, I
believe that we should work within our present system of selfregulation, constantly striving to improve both the content and the
enforcement of lawyer ethics codes.'
lawyer may withdraw from representing a client, if the "client ... [insists] that the
lawyer take action that the lawyer finds repugnant or, in some instances, when the
lawyer has a fundamental disagreement").
77. See generally Nancy J. Moore, Professionalism Reconsidered, 1987 Am. Bar
Found. Res. J. 773 [hereinafter Moore, ProfessionalismReconsidered).
78. Under one account of professionalism, a profession's code of ethics is the
product of a contract between the profession and the larger society of which it is a
part; the contract results when society agrees to give the profession a legal monopoly
in return for a promise that professional practice will be performed in the public
interest. See Nancy J. Moore, The Usefidness of Ethical Codes, 1989 Ann. Surv. of
Am. Law 7, 12-14 [hereinafter Moore, Usefidness]; Moore, Professionalism
Reconsidered,supra note 77, at 784-85. The code then establishes standards by which
the profession can be held to public account; in other words, society has delegated
responsibility to professionals, but it can relieve them of this responsibility, if they do
not live up to their public pronouncements. Moore, Usefidness, supra, at 13.
Similarly, Ted Schneyer argues that the ABA, which has "aspired to be the voice of
the bar at the national level," maintains its visibility and authority by formulating
ethics rules for the entire legal profession that are taken seriously by legal decisionmakers, such as the state supreme courts. Ted Schneyer, The ALP's Restatement and
the ABA's Model Rules: Rivals or Complements?, 46 Okla. L Rev. 25, 28 (1993)
(emphasis omitted).
79. Thus, Deborah arguably commits what Ted Schneyer has characterized as
"the sin of drawing conclusions about the proper allocation of regulatory authority on
the basis of a single-institutional analysis rather than the more appropriate
comparative analysis." Ted Schneyer, Legal Process Scholarshipand the Regulation of
Lawyers, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 33, 67 (1996) (discussing an article that criticized an
ABA ethics opinion regarding contingent fees on the ground that lawyer self-interest
prevailed over the public interest). For an excellent discussion of the new "legal
process scholarship," which focuses on the comparative competence of various
institutions, see generally Schneyer, supra; see also David B. Wilkins, Who Should
Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 799 (1992).
80. Chapter 6 of Deborah's book is full of excellent proposals to improve
regulation of the legal profession. Some of her suggestions have already been
adopted, or are currently being studied, by various bar or bar-related entities. For
example, she recommends improving the bar admission process by eliminating overly
intrusive character and fitness inquiries, particularly in sensitive areas, such as
psychological counseling. Rhode, supra note 6, at 155. The recently revised standard
questionnaire of the National Conference of Bar Examiners asks only three questions
regarding mental health and addiction: (1) whether the applicant has been diagnosed
with or treated for bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia, or other psychotic disorder,
within the last five years; (2) whether the applicant currently has any conditions or
impairments that currently affect, or if left untreated, could affect, the ability of the
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CONCLUSION

Getting a legal ethics code's confidentiality provisions just right is
not an easy task. There are a number of factors that must be taken
into account, including the different interests of clients, the public, and
the lawyers themselves. On the one hand, I argue that Sean SeLegue
is wrong when he criticizes the Ethics 2000 Proposals as doing too
much to tip the scale in favor of the public good. On the other hand, I
argue that Deborah Rhode's assessment that the Ethics 2000
Proposals do not go far enough is also inaccurate. I believe that the
arguments I make are warranted by careful consideration of the
historical limits of lawyers' obligations to clients, as well as the proper
role of lawyers as independent moral agents, and not agents of the
state. Although I was disappointed that the House of Delegates did
not adopt all of the Ethics 2000 Commission's proposals regarding
confidentiality, I also disagree with Deborah's view that this failure
constitutes evidence that the public would be better served by
rejecting the present system of self-regulation in favor of direct
control by legislatures or administrative agencies.
Rather, my
experience in reviewing the myriad of individual state variations to
the ABA's Model Rules has been a heartening one, leading me to
conclude the contrary: that the present system is functioning pretty
well, that direct public regulation could pose too great a risk in areas
of particular sensitivity, and that it is in the public interest for lawyers
to continue to consider themselves as professionals with special, but
limited, responsibilities to further the public good.

applicant to practice law competently and professionally; and (3) whether in the past
five years the applicant has raised the issue of mental health or addiction as a defense,
mitigation, or explanation, in the course of an administrative or judicial proceeding,
or investigation. Nat'l Conference of Bar Exam'rs, Request for Preparation of
Character Report, Questions 25-27, available at http://www.ncbex.orglcharacterl
Standard0l.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2002). Deborah further proposes that "states
should move either to a national system of admission or to a more effective means of
accommodating interstate practice." Rhode, supra note 6, at 155. The recently
appointed ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice has been meeting for
over a year, and recently issued an interim report recommending substantial changes
to professional regulation, with the purpose of accommodating interstate practice. See
ABA, Interim Report of the Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice (Nov. 2001),
available at http://www.bostonbar.org/gr/adhoc/mjpinterim.PDF. Finally, the ABA
has recommended a number of substantial changes to improve the enforcement of
disciplinary rules. See Lawyer Regulation for a New Century, supra note 63.

